During the Vice Presidential debate the candidates were naturally asked about the present financial crisis. I was interested to hear Governor Palin for the Republicans (answering according to her prepared script, of course) ascribe it to greed on Wall Street; that no doubt is one of the causes and will remain the media's favourite, but it is by no means the only one.
Greed in borrowing money, after all, requires two to tango: a greedy borrower wanting money that he or she can't afford to repay, and a greedy lender prepared to lend it. The benighted individuals who racked up the national debt of a small third world country on their credit cards were as greedy as the lenders who kept moronically dolling out the cash. The media were irresponsible for promoting the consumer culture and the public were irresponsible for buying into it. The state in Britain didn't regulate the lending market and the market didn't regulate itself. As a result we developed in many instances a pyramid-scheme economy.
The first manifestation of the pyramid economy was in personal debt. Credit cards were offered so easily that many (including some sophisticated city workers of my acquaintance) were tempted to borrow and borrow by the offering of no repayments for substantial periods coupled with 0% on balance transfers for new customers. As long as they could, at the end of the 0% interest period, shift the ever increasing balance onto a new provider, the cycle could continue. Necessarily the run would have to come to an end at some point, but too many people turned a blind eye to that mathematical certainty.
The second pyramid scheme involved mortgages. As long as the housing market continued to increase, people were tempted to borrow and borrow against the theoretically increasing equity. Others were tempted to try their hand at becoming property tycoons, by continually buying-to-let with as much borrowing as they could find. On paper in a rising market they were multi-millionares; once the bubble burst they were on paper very broke indeed. Once again, the housing market could not increase forever, but the borrowing culture depending upon it doing so. Therefore, it was a mathematical certainty that the market would crash in that respect too.
The third manifestation of the pyramid scheme came in how the banks dealt with the ever-increasing amount of mortgage debt on their books. A mortgage is a transaction whereby the lender makes a profit out of the fact that the borrower pays back the capital sum plus interest. Therefore, the profit is made once the borrower starts - and only to the extent that he continues - paying back the debt and interest. Yet the banks acted as though the very act of signing up a mortgage generated a profit in itself. Salesmen were awarded commissions by signing up new mortgagors. They were therefore given every incentive to sign as many as they could. The lending departments of a bank would be rewarded for this activity, as would those in charge of the bank. None of that bore any relation to the underlying profitability - or non-profitability - of the mortgage contract itself. The bank would therefore have to generate money to pay for it all. A favoured tactic was to dress up the mortgage and sell it into the securities market. Here many buyers made the mistake that small investors often do: assuming that because the product they were buying came from someone with a good name, it must be a good product. But junk mortgages disguised as Bear Sterns securites products were still junk mortgages. As each was bought and sold the vendor would have to take a cut to make the deal profitable. Thus the underlying transaction would be even less profitable each time it was bought and sold. And so, once again, a spiral with only one end was created.
Having drafted the above, I picked up a copy of the Spectator, which had a further explanation for the US mortgage disaster behind so much of the global chaos. According to
this article by Dennis Sewell:
The root problem was not financial — it was political, and those truly responsible for this fiasco were not bankers, nor even Bush Republicans; they were Clinton Democrats.For generations, America’s bankers have been firmly refusing credit to those they judged unworthy of it. Yet the mountain of toxic subprime debt that has threatened to overwhelm the entire financial system, and the astonishing number of mortgage foreclosures across the United States, is proof that, at some point in the relatively recent past, bankers radically altered their behaviour and began to shower mortgages on borrowers who had no realistic prospect of keeping up their repayments. What could possibly have induced them to act so recklessly, and so out of character? The facile answer to that question is greed, the lure of a fast and easy buck. The correct answer is that banks were bullied, cajoled and coerced into lowering their lending standards by politicians in pursuit of an ideological agenda.(...) The main thrust of the Clinton housing strategy was to increase home ownership among the poor, and particularly among blacks and Hispanics. White House aides, in familiar West Wing style, could parrot the many social advantages that would accrue: high levels of home ownership correlated with less violent crime, better school performance, a heightened sense of commun-ity. But standing in the way of the realisation of this dream were the conservative lending policies of the banks, which required such inconvenient and old-fashioned things as cash deposits and regular repayments — things the poor and minorities often could not provide. Clinton told the banks to be more creative.(...) [W]hen little or no overt or deliberate racial discrimination was discovered among the mortgage lenders, [the state] turned to trying to prove ‘disparate treatment’ of minority groups, a notion similar to that of unintentional ‘institutional racism’. If a bank refused loans to proportionally more black applicants than white ones, for instance, the onus would fall on it to prove it had good grounds for doing so or face settlement penalties running into millions of dollars. A series of highly publicised cases were brought on this basis, starting in 1994. Eventually the investigators would turn somewhat desperately to ‘disparate impact’, a form of discrimination so abstract and rarefied as to be imperceptible to its supposed victims, and indeed often only discernible at all through the application of multivariate regression analysis to information stored on regulators’ databases. These mortgage banks, which have been responsible for issuing about three quarters of the dodgy subprime loans that are proving troublesome today, quickly took the hint. From the mid-1990s they began to abandon their formerly rigorous lending criteria. Mortgages were offered with only 3 per cent deposit requirements, and eventually with no deposit requirement at all. The mortgage banks fell over one another to provide loans to low-income households and especially to minority customers. ...
The national banks, responsible for the remaining quarter of the current subprime loans, were put under a different kind of pressure by the Clinton team to boost their low-income and minority lending too. Changes were made to the Community Reinvestment Act to establish a system by which banks were rated according to how much lending they did in low-income neighbourhoods. A good CRA rating was necessary if a bank wanted to get regulators to sign off on mergers, expansions, even new branch openings. A poor rating could be disastrous for a bank’s business plan. It was a different kind of coercion, but just as effective.How much blame can truly be apportioned to the Clinton Administration's interventions, as opposed to the general increased recklesness of banks I cannot answer. In Britain there was not the state did not act in the same way (in Britain we tend to respond to low income/minority housing problems with council stock). The pyramid scheme I described above was clearly driven by greed and short-sightedness. The American crash, whatever its cause, only hastened the inevitable. I tend to answer the question of whether it was the greedy public, the irresponsible media, the greedy lenders, the slack regulators or the non-existent self regulators, with the short answer that it was all of them.
The much more important question is what to do next. Talk of a taxpayer bail-out needs more detail. Take the housing market. Are we to give taxpayers' money to the homeowners, thus giving them a windfall for silly borrowing (at the expense of those such as myself who deliberately maintained conservative mortgages)? Or are we to give it straight to the lenders, thus giving them a windfall for silly lending and enabling them to reposess the houses of the failed borrowers and give themselves a second windfall, and thus also enabling them to continue the pyramid scheme lending system for longer? This I find particularly infuriating given that those in charge of the lending institutions have paid themselves absurdly high bonuses over the years (most of which they pumped into the housing market thus fuelling the boom and the continuation of the pyramid scheme) and didn't always pay taxes with any enthusiasm, the taxes they now seek to have given to them to save them from themselves.
Stephen of Rough Trade gives his thoughts
here. I agree with his conclusion that the chips should be left to lie where they fall. The only argument I can see for the state intervening is that it would have to deal with the fallout of the destroyed savings accounts should it come to it (by the social welfare safety net) and so if it could intervene to prevent that happening it might as well. But I'm not comfortable with the proposed uses of taxpayers' money that I have seen. The British state is guaranteeing deposits up to £35k; the Irish and Greek governments have offered unlimited guarantees. This is the sort of rash financial act that caused the crash in the first place: if things got really bad, the only way the state could make good that promise would be by printing more money a la Germany in the 20s or Zimbabwe today; far from saving everyone's savings it would render them worthless. Else the state just borrows and borrows on more and more unfavourable terms and leaves the next generation to pay the bill (in other words, just like rash credit card behaviour ....).
Better, I would submit, that we allow the market to take the consequences. If the state must intervene, let it do so to only to the extent of ensuring an orderly wind-down of failed institutions. In other words, no more Northern Rocks. Let the state appoint administrators to selll off the assets in an orderly fashion and decide the best way to deal with those that are left broke, but no more lending and no more allowing unsustainable businesses to continue. In the usual course of events, of course, it is illegal for a company to trade whilst insolvent. There are sound reasons for this, and they apply with equal force when it is the state behind the insolvent company.
That proposed solution may seem harsh. But if it means a lesson to this generation on the value of things as well as their price, then so much the better.
Post script:
here, from Stray, is an entirely different way to reach the same conclusion.