The Great War II: why the trenches?

The enduring images of the Western front involve hundreds of thousands of brave young men going over the top to certain death, fighting over a few yards of muddy, shell-cratered ground. I have been to some of the extraordinarily moving places: Vimy Ridge, Tyne Cot and the Menin Gate, and seen the countless rows of crosses and names on walls. How on earth did that unimaginable slaughter come to pass? Who was responsible for this inhumanity?

The short answer is that the trenches on the Western front were a most unhappy accident for all involved. It was, in fact, the very last thing which both Germany and Britain had any intention of becoming involved in when they went to war in 1914. All of the pre-war planning of both had been to avoid a protracted slugging match, which experience and technology told them would be a bloodbath on an horrific scale. The British had had trouble enough attacking Boers over the plains of the veldt in South Africa and besieging the Maori Pa system in New Zealand; to try and assault the entrenched positions of a major industrial power would be another matter altogether, and they knew it.

Instead, Britain concentrated all her strength on her navy. Her great economic power derived from trading with the Empire, which depended on the sea routes being secured. If that was a weakness, however, her island status combined with a powerful navy rendered her uniquely invulnerable among European nations to invasion by any of her Continental rivals. Hitler with 1940s naval and aerial power didn't dare cross the channel; no nation in 1914 would even have considered it. This gave Britain a good chance of opting out of any European war or otherwise becoming involved only to the extent that it suited; at the worst, she could cut her losses and retreat back to the fortress. At the end of any such conflict, with the other combatants likely ruined, Britain would hold the whip hand, or at least a decent set of bargaining chips, in any peace negotiations. It was for that reason that Britain maintained what was a tiny, if well-trained and equipped, army by major European standards and threw all her strength into having the world's most powerful navy, which she still had in 1914. When war broke out, and Britain intervened ostensibly to protect neutral Belgium, her strategy remained focused on the seas. Her army was to bolster the French left flank, hopefully to the extent of tipping the balance against the Germans. Meanwhile the navy would blockade Germany into submission, or compel the Germans to send their High Seas fleet out in desperation to face annihilation at the hands of the Grand Fleet.

Meanwhile, the Germans had their own issues. They were a strongly emerging power whose industrial, economic and military strength was becoming the leader of Europe. They had no overseas empire to speak of, but were shifting the balance of power and influence in Europe. They had one significant problem, however: the Franco-Russian alliance. War with one would mean war with both, and that would mean war on two fronts. Though blatantly superior to either, and perhaps even both combined, having to face France and Russia on opposite sides of her borders might be beyond even the Germans. Their second difficulty was that any long-term war would be greatly to their disadvantage, especially if they were successfully blockaded.

To surmount those problems the Germans devised what became known as the Schlieffen Plan. By striking through the northern low countries, the Germans hoped to reach Paris before the cumbersome and inefficient Russians had the chance to mobilise properly. If they took Paris the French would be out of the fight. Going through neutral Belgium risked bringing Britain into the war, but the tiny British army (that 'contemptible little army' as the Kaiser put it, which the British promptly adopted as a badge of honour, hence the 'old contemptibles') with the logistical barrier of the channel would not be able to make enough impact to stop the Germans reaching Paris, nor would the Royal Navy's blockade have time to take effect. Once France fell Britain would lose interest: invasion across the channel wouldn't be any easier in the other direction either. Then Germany's efforts could be concentrated against the Russians.

In the event, not for the first or last time in any conflict, both protagonists' strategies failed. The Germans did not manage to reach Paris. Partly this was due to the British intervention, though the British were not there in enough numbers to be decisive. It was due more to the fact that the Germans acted prematurely in cutting off the French incursion into Germany (they were being lulled into a trap, but the door was shut too early) and the colossal sacrifice made by the French in the first few months of the war. Once the German advance had been halted, however, the allies were unable to outmanouvre them and force a retreat. Then began the famous 'race to the sea' as both sides frantically constructed trench defences, which had proved extraordinarily difficult to defeat. Stalemate ensued.

Both sides, therefore, ended up with precisely the opposite of what they had intended. The Germans were tied down in a long-term war on both borders with a Royal Navy blockade to boot. The British were committed to a large scale land war and, worse, came to realise that their allies would not win the fight. France and Russia could not defeat Germany. If anyone was going to, and thus prevent German domination of Europe, it would have to be Britain, and not with a small army either. Only a commitment to 'total war' with all of Britain's industrial strength and all her population putting shoulder to the wheel would stop Germany. And they would have to do it amidst the mud of the trenches, on the battlefield as it was, not the battlefield of their choosing. In the next post I hope to set out a few points about how they did not, contrary to popular opinion, conduct that unwelcome battle in a supremely incompetent fashion, but rather learned (at great cost) from their mistakes and brought about the successful conclusion.